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Weekly Summary

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The WELKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary, Harry Clauss,

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ARGENTINA: GUERRILLA SWEEP

After more than a year of resisting presidential efforts to give the army a major role in the counter-terrorist campaign, army commander General Anaya is at last preparing to direct a sweep on one of the guerrilla strongholds. The turnabout can probably be attributed to the military's dissatisfaction with police ineffectiveness and the conviction among army leaders that public opinion now is prepared psychologically to accept the fact that the police alone cannot stamp out terrorism.

The first target of the army drive is in the northwest province of Tucuman, where the People's Revolutionary Army has its stronghold. The guerrillas have long had the sympathy of local workers in the depressed sugar industry, and some of the principal training camps for the insurgents are in the nearby mountains. Government forces have attempted to destroy this guerrilla bastion before, but poor police and military coordination, a failure to act promptly on intelligence, and difficult mountain and jungle terrain have hampered them.

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The People's Revolutionary Army, which has suffered setbacks in Cordoba and elsewhere as a result of the government crackdown, will probably have its activities in Tucuman disrupted by the new campaign. Nevertheless, it can be expected to react by stepping up terrorism in Buenos Aires, where the police have been less effective in dealing with the underground organizations.

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